A debate in China’s foreign ministry on how to respond — or whether to respond — to a court case over the disputed South China Sea highlights how tensions over policy are complicating President Xi Jinping’s efforts to project the
A debate in China’s foreign ministry on how to respond — or whether to respond — to a court case over the disputed South China Sea highlights how tensions over policy are complicating President Xi Jinping’s efforts to project the country as a responsible power.
China is boycotting arbitration hearings brought by the Philippines in The Hague that are heading to a conclusion next year, saying it doesn’t recognize the court’s jurisdiction. That fits its approach of dealing with disputes on a state-to-state basis, rather than through courts or international groupings, but its absence means there is no counter-argument to the Philippines’ case.
While there was an internal discussion about whether to have a presence when the hearings started last month, international law experts were unable to assure policymakers of absolute success in defending China’s territorial claims, according to two people familiar with the matter.
China muddied the waters in December 2014, when it filed a position paper arguing the Philippine submission was about a sovereignty dispute and therefore outside the court’s jurisdiction, adding China has “indisputable sovereignty” as the “first country to discover, name, explore and exploit the resources” of the area. The Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected the argument and deemed the paper “as effectively constituting a plea.”
Now, the case has become a toxic football inside the foreign ministry. Two departments argued about responsibility for handling it for about a year before passing it to low-level officials in China’s foreign policy hierarchy, the people said, asking not to be identified because the discussions are private. The ministry didn’t respond to faxed questions Thursday about its handling of the case.
“There is a view that China has this brilliant, highly calibrated, two-steps-forward-one-step-back genius-like foreign policy,” said James Kraska, research director at the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College. “I dunno. That may be going too far.”
The internal discussions indicate officials are worried about being linked to the matter in case the Philippines wins and China suffers international embarrassment, given the priority Xi has given to China’s assertions. He’s linked South China Sea island-building to national pride, at the center of the country’s resurgence as a military power.
It also points to a lack of strategic vision among foreign ministry officials, who tend to be career diplomats without the political background often found among senior policymakers in other countries, according to Zhang Baohui, director of the Center for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong.
China’s actions can bring potentially unintended consequences. While it’s had success in beefing up its presence in the South China Sea, building the islands on reclaimed reefs despite the protestations of the U.S. and others, its actions have also pushed claimants such as the Philippines and Vietnam closer to the U.S.
Some non-claimant countries are also being drawn in. Singapore this month formalized an arrangement where U.S. P-8 surveillance planes will be deployed in the city state for flights over the South China Sea. Indonesia, concerned that China’s claims may encroach on the exclusive economic zone it derives from the Natuna Islands, is considering using drones and submarines to strengthen its grip over the gas-rich waters.
Should the arbitration court hand down a decision that largely favors the Philippines — probably in mid-2016 — China’s response will be hard to predict. That may create more uncertainly in waters that host about 30 percent of global trade.
Analysts have long hunted for clues on China’s foreign policy thinking. Henry Kissinger in his 2011 book “On China” presented the process as one based on the teachings of Sun Tzu, an ancient general whose diplomatic handbook “The Art of War” advocates long-term goals executed in tandem by various actors and based on knowledge of the opponent.
That may have been the case when Kissinger was dealing with China’s late, great statesman, Premier Zhou Enlai. Zhou laid down the policy of non-intervention that is only now being debated as China expands its economic interests around the world.
Now, “on every level in the foreign ministry there are career diplomats and many Chinese scholars — me included — think those people’s backgrounds are not sufficient for directing China’s rise,” Zhang said. “For a major power like China, you need people who can think ‘grand strategy’.”
Wang Yi — in the role since March 2013 — entered the ministry from university in 1982. His predecessor, Yang Jiechi, now a state councilor and China’s top diplomat, joined the ministry in 1975, the last days of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution.
China’s diplomats have had foreign policy successes this year. Yang and Japan’s National Security Adviser Shotaro Yachi brokered an agreement in July to hold regular “high level strategic dialogues” as part of the effort to improve ties strained by a territorial dispute. Last month, the ministry officiated over the first summit in three years between China, Japan and South Korea.
In the Middle East, the ministry is cautiously guiding the response to the Syrian crisis, with China last month backing a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for efforts to “eradicate” Islamic State safe havens in Iraq and Syria, while sticking to its policy of non-intervention. It has softened its message in some countries with the greater use of loans and development aid.
Still, Xi’s visit to the U.S. in September struggled to get traction for his proposal for a “new model of major country relationship,” a phrase that connotes a greater level of parity between the world’s two largest economies.
The timing of his sojourn in the U.S. clashed with a tour by Pope Francis, who had rock star coverage in the U.S. media. A Chinese official said the foreign ministry may have “underestimated” the influence of the leader of the world’s smallest state.
“China is as prone to foreign policy blunders as any state,” said Nick Bisley, a professor of international relations at La Trobe University in Melbourne. “The reality is that there are complex internal politics and bureaucratic rivalries that can and do gum up the machine from time to time and handling complex issues that are in the international eye are always hard. Plus, it’s a game they’re relatively new to playing, so not surprising there are snafus from time to time.”
