Pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong persist in part because of the self-defeating way local authorities — and their masters in Beijing — have responded to them. More than once the encampments on downtown streets have started to dwindle as unfinished
Pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong persist in part because of the self-defeating way local authorities — and their masters in Beijing — have responded to them. More than once the encampments on downtown streets have started to dwindle as unfinished schoolwork and sleep-deprivation take their toll on the middle-class student protesters. Then authorities dispatch police or groups of thugs to attack barricades, as happened on Monday and again on Tuesday. Or they abruptly announce the cancellation of talks they had previously agreed to, as happened last week. In each case, the response has been a resurgence of people to the streets and the erection of new blockades.
To those who demand a genuinely democratic election for the territory’s next leader — a position that polls show is supported by a decisive majority of Hong Kong’s 7.2 million people — the current administration of Leung Chun-ying has offered only two responses. One is to call on the students and their supporters to quietly accept that there is no chance that China’s Communist leadership will make concessions and to go home. The other is to employ force and to threaten more of it. Neither tactic offers the possibility of ending the crisis in a way that will enhance Hong Kong’s political stability, reassure investors in its free-market economy or prevent future upheavals.
Instead, the costs of the regime’s rigidity steadily mount. It has thrown away the possibility of fully implementing the “one country, two systems” model promised by former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping — an achievement that not only would allow Hong Kong to flourish but also provide pro-unification forces in Taiwan with a powerful argument. It has alienated a rising generation in Hong Kong, which is likely to be more hostile to Beijing than the moderate liberals who now would be front-runners in a free election.
Most dangerously, the regime risks cornering itself into carrying out a violent crackdown on the protesters. That would inspire global protests, risk a backlash in mainland China and besmirch the “Chinese dream” leader Xi Jinping has promised before he has even defined it.
If that outcome is to be avoided, Xi will have to show some flexibility. He must make some concession to the protesters: dismissing Leung would satisfy many of them, while others would settle for good-faith negotiations with the Hong Kong administration. Even if procedures for the 2017 election for a new chief executive are to remain unchanged, other concessions are possible, such as steps to make the next election for Hong Kong’s legislature more democratic.
The one policy that can’t work is attempting to make the protesters and their agenda disappear. The last month has reinforced Hong Kong’s identity as a place where citizens are ready to resist dictates from Beijing and see democracy as an inevitable destination. How much turmoil the territory endures along the way may be determined by Xi; he would be wise to start engaging the young people on the barricades.
