That support could weaken if Syria’s economy continues to deteriorate as a result of Western economic sanctions, but that process would take time, and meanwhile the risks of Syria fracturing into warring sectarian camps would only increase. That’s a recipe for continued violence and instability in an already volatile region. Yet given the opposition of Russia and China to additional diplomatic measures, and the lack of a clear-cut path for military intervention, as in Libya or other peacekeeping venues, it’s difficult to see what the alternatives are.
Baltimore Sun | Editorial
Pressure is mounting on Syria’s President Bashar Assad to step down. Over the weekend, the Arab League called on Assad to immediately hand over power to one of his deputies as the first step toward the formation of a national unity government, with parliamentary and presidential elections to follow within two months. Assad’s defiant rejection of that demand puts his country on a path toward what now seems likely to be a protracted and bloody civil war.
The plan put forward by the Arab League, which sent observers to Syria last month to monitor the escalating violence there, appears modeled on a similar proposal by the Gulf Cooperation Council that allowed Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to transfer power to his vice president and leave the country in the face of an increasingly violent opposition. Saleh left Yemen on Sunday and is expected to travel to the U.S. for treatment of injuries he suffered in an assassination attempt last year.
Assad, however, seems intent on digging in his heels against any suggestion to step down as a way of resolving the crisis engulfing his country. The United Nations estimates some 5,400 civilian demonstrators have been killed by Assad’s security forces since the uprising began last year. The slaughter has continued even in the weeks since Arab League observers arrived in the country, despite Assad’s promises to pull his troops back from rebellious towns and villages. Meanwhile, the government continues to insist that the protesters are terrorists acting on behalf of foreign powers seeking to destabilize the country.
The Arab League position is the strongest signal yet that Arab leaders want Assad out. The European Union and the U.S. have tightened economic sanctions against the Assad regime, but the international community clearly wants the Arab League to take the lead in proposing stronger action. And the league itself is divided on that question.
The Gulf Arab states, led by Qatar, seem prepared to ask the U.N. Security Council to authorize a no-fly zone and military assistance to the rebels as a next step. But Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon and others oppose any military intervention on the model of Libya. And even among the Gulf states there are divisions; Saudi Arabia, in particular, is leery of authorizing a model that later could be applied to its own restive Shiite provinces and those in neighboring Bahrain.
Moreover, even if the Arab League requests Security Council action, any move by that body is likely to be blocked by Russia and China, which oppose foreign military intervention in Syria. Russia just signed a deal to sell Syria billions of dollars worth of advanced fighter jets, and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has emerged as the Assad regime’s most reliable backer at the U.N. China is still smarting over what it considers Western overreaching after it abstained on the Security Council vote authorizing Western military intervention in Libya. Assad clearly is counting on both countries to shield him from international pressure and allow him to take his time crushing his domestic opposition.
Given the uncertainty of Security Council action and the internal divisions among the Arab League countries themselves, Assad may well believe he can weather the crisis even if he has to kill tens of thousands more of his own citizens to remain in power. He still enjoys the support of military and business elites in the country’s two main cities, Damascus and Aleppo, as well as middle-class Christians and members of his own Alawite sect of Islam, who have prospered under his rule at the expense of the country’s Sunni majority.
That support could weaken if Syria’s economy continues to deteriorate as a result of Western economic sanctions, but that process would take time, and meanwhile the risks of Syria fracturing into warring sectarian camps would only increase. That’s a recipe for continued violence and instability in an already volatile region. Yet given the opposition of Russia and China to additional diplomatic measures, and the lack of a clear-cut path for military intervention, as in Libya or other peacekeeping venues, it’s difficult to see what the alternatives are.